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Articles
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ACTION AND INACTION IN THE LAW OF
TORT: SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF NONFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE
FROM THE FIFTEENTH THROUGH THE TWENTIETH CENTURIES
Jean Elting Rowe and Theodore Silver 807
For nearly five hundred years negligence law has distinguished between "misfea-
sance" and "nonfeasance," purporting to provide that the former occasions liability
while the latter does not. This distinction arose in the fifteenth century when the
concept of "duty," in its modern form, was unknown to the common law. When a
court of that era ruled that a defendant had committed a misfeasance, it meant
that the defendant, whether by act or omission, had failed to perform what mod-
em negligence law would label a duty. Conversely, a court spoke of nonfeasance
when a defendant had no duty to act or forebear. Those original usages have been
lost in a tangle of careless judicial expression. On one hand liability is said to
attach to an imprudent act or omission, while on the other, negligence law sanc-
tions the statement that nonfeasance, which it equates with inaction, creates no
liability. Through historical inquiry the authors demonstrate that the law never
intended that nonfeasance and misfeasance should be distinguished, because inac-
tion is one form of action and conclude that courts are, and always have been,
striving for this simple truth: one should be liable for harm caused by acting in
violation of a duty, or by failing to act when action was the defendant's duty.
THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS
IMPACT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF LAW FIRM DISSOLUTION, CON-
TINGENT FEE CASES AND THE NO COMPENSATION RULE
Mark I. Weinstein 857
As states debate the wisdom of adopting the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (the
"RUPA"), an area that will be closely scrutinized involves partnership dissolution
and the No Compensation Rule. In particular, this Article examines the strengths
and weaknesses of the existing No Compensation Rule as it impacts on law firm
dissolutions and the difficulties encountered over the division of contingent fee
cases. This Article supports the RUPA approach, which allows courts to award
compensation to departing partners where it is equitable to do so. In addition, the
Article provides a suggested standard to be applied under the RUPA concerning
whether to award compensation and how to calculate the actual amount of com-
pensation to award an individual partner.
Comments
NLRA PREEMPTION PUT SIMPLY: LrvADAS v. BRADSHAW 887
SURROGACY CONTRACTS IN THE 1990's: THE CONTROVERSY AND
DEBATE CONTINUES 903
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE HUMAN BODY: THE COMMERCIALIZA-
TION OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 931




TORY TAKINGS-The United States Supreme Court held that in
order to survive a takings challenge, a development exaction
must have an essential nexus with a legitimate state interest,
and also that a rough proportionality must exist between the
development exaction and the burdens to be imposed by the
proposed development.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 985
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION-The United States Supreme Court held that a state
law creating a public school district for a village, whose bound-
aries had been drawn to include only members of a religious
sect, violated the First Amendment by delegating political au-
thority to a group defined by its religious character.
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). 1007
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JURY SELECTION-PEREMPTORY CHAL-
LENGES--The United States Supreme Court held that intention-
al gender discrimination by state actors when exercising pe-
remptory challenges in the jury selection process violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). 1033
SECURITIES REGULATION-SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934-SECTION 10(B)-SECONDARY LIABILITY-AIDING AND
ABEITING-The United States Supreme Court held that there is
no cause of action for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
Central Bank, Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). 1053
ADMIRALTY-SETrLEMENT-LIABILITY OF NONSETTLING DEFEN-
DANT-PROPORTIONATE SHARE-The United States Supreme
Court held that a nonsettling defendant's liability in an admiral-
ty action should be calculated by an allocation of proportionate
responsibility and not by giving the nonsettling defendant a
dollar for dollar credit for the amount paid by a settling defen-
dant.
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994). 1073
EMPLOYMENT LAW-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-NEG-
LIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS-The United States
Supreme Court held that negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress is a cognizable injury under the Federal Employers' Liabili-
ty Act provided that the employee satisfies the elements of the
common law zone-of-danger test.
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall,
114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). 1093
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO COUN-
SEL-AMBIGUOUS REQUESTS-The United States Supreme Court
held that after a knowing and voluntary waiver.of the Miranda
rights, officers may continue questioning until the suspect
makes an unambiguous request for counsel.
Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994). 1109
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